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The U.S. welfare state has been under attack from both sides of the aisle
since the mid-1970s. Using the lens of history, the following pages will
argue that neither the rise of the welfare state in the 1930s nor the current
attack were merely accidental. Instead, each was a response to a particular
crisis of profitability because the institutional arrangements that had
created the conditions for profit-making in the prior fifty years had dete-
riorated. The policies no longer worked for the powers-that-be and had to
be “reformed.”
Mimi Abramovitz is professor of Social Policy, Hunter College School of Social Work and
The Graduate Center, City University of New York, and author of Under Attack, Fighting
Back: Women and Welfare in the United States.
The collapse of the American economy in the 1930s led to the rise of thewelfare state.1 At that time, the national elite blamed their economic
problems on failures of the market and saw greater government spending as
the way out. They counted on the government to offer a New Deal that would
restore profits by fostering economic growth and muting social unrest sparked
by the Great Depression.
A second major crisis of profitability surfaced in the mid-to-late 1970s. This
time, the leaders in business and government blamed their economic woes on
public programs that had grown since the Depression, the gains of social
movements, and “personal irresponsibility.” Their solution, known as
Neoliberalism but also Reaganomics or Supply-Side Economics, led to another
restructuring of the political economy, one that limited the role of the state,
especially the welfare state.
The First Economic Crisis: The Rise
of the U.S. Welfare State, 1935 to 1975
The U.S. welfare state emerged in 1935, some fifty years after Western Euro-
pean nations had invested in social welfare. Before this time, most U.S. social
welfare provision had been the province of cities and the states. But the 1929
stock market collapse made it clear that the prevailing laissez-faire structures
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that had fueled economic growth since 1890 had faltered. The deterioration of
these prior institutional arrangements, which had created the conditions for
profit making, led the elite to conclude that a more active state was needed to
save capitalism from itself. Faced with extreme, material hardship during the
Depression, the dispossessed took to the streets. They too demanded a new
and stronger response from government.
The resulting New Deal programs ushered in a major restructuring of the
political economy that included an expanded role for the government in many
arenas, including social welfare. Generally viewed as the birth of the modern
welfare state in the United States, among other things, the 1935 Social Security
Act transferred social welfare responsibility from the states to the federal
government and created an entitlement to income support. The historic shift in
social policy was made legitmate in the late 1930s by two events. The Supreme
Court declared the constitutionality of federal responsibility for the general
welfare, and officialdom accepted the economic theory of the British econo-
mist, John Maynard Keynes, that called for greater government spending to
increase aggregate demand and otherwise stimulate economic growth.
Restoring Profitability: The
Functions of the Welfare State
From 1945 to 1975 — often called “the golden era” of capitalism — the
welfare state grew in response to population growth, increased need for
assistance, and the victories of the increasingly militant trade union, civil
rights, women’s liberation, and other movements. The new welfare state
helped to save capitalism from itself by carrying out a complex set of social,
economic, and political functions that mediated poverty, enhanced profits, and
muted social unrest.
Social Functions The social functions of the welfare state included both relief
and regulation. Welfare state programs offered relief by providing both a
minimum level of income below which no one was expected to live and social
services to ensure daily functioning. But the welfare state also regulated the
lives of clients by requiring recipients to conform to white middle-class norms
in order to receive assistance.
Economic Functions The welfare state programs also offered numerous
economic benefits to business and industry — activities that at times weakened
the social function of relief. By putting cash into people’s hands the welfare
state ensured the daily consumption of goods and services produced by busi-
ness. Cash assistance also cushioned employers (and consumers) against
economic loss during periodic economic downturns. Business profited as well
because cash benefits pressed wages down. That is, cash grants supplemented
wages, which enabled employers to pay less. Restrictive eligibility rules and
low benefits forced recipients into the bottom rungs of the labor market where
an enlarged supply of labor also lowered wage payments. The nation’s health,
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education, training, and social service programs further supplied employers
with a healthy, productive, and properly socialized work force at taxpayer’s
expense.
Finally, the welfare state supported profits by mediating the tension between
the requirements of profitable production and requirements for effective
family maintenance. For example, profitable production depends on the ability
of families to manage consumption; to ensure the productivity of family
members; and to care for those too old, young, or ill to support themselves.
Paradoxically, low wages, high unemployment, and meager public benefits on
which profits also depend lower the standard of living and undercut the
capacity of families to carry out these critical care-taking tasks. The growing
welfare state eased the tension between profits and need by subsidizing,
however minimally, family maintenance — typically supported by women’s
unpaid labor in the home.2
Political Functions On the political front, the welfare state helped to maintain
social and political stability. As noted above, its rules and regulations typically
enforced work and family norms and otherwise controlled daily behavior. The
provision of benefits also quelled the discontent that arose when inequalities
built into the market economy contradicted the democratic promise of equal
opportunity for all. When the resulting protests threatened to disrupt the
smooth functioning of the economy on which profitable production depended,
the government sought to restore order by negotiating reforms to ease the
discontent and to otherwise legitimize the system as fair to all. Historically, the
state has also repressed dissent, often by force.
The Second Crises: The Fall of the
Welfare State From 1975 to the Present
From 1935 to1975, the expanding welfare state sustained the above functions
with reasonable success. But everything changed in the mid-1970s as structural
shifts in the global economy set off a second major crisis of profitability. The
changes — third world revolutions, reduced access to cheap raw material, the
loss of U.S. world hegemony, mounting international economic competition, and
the victories of U.S. social movements — eventually weakened the institutional
arrangements set up in the 1930s to promote profits, political stability, and
family well-being.3 This time, the national elite decided the welfare state was
part of the problem and argued for its demise. What had happened?
For one, de-industrialization at home and the exportation of production
abroad left corporate America less reliant on U.S. workers. With this, business
became less and less willing to support welfare state programs that previously
helped them to maintain the current and future work force and to appease
social movements. In addition, the elite argued that high domestic spending
had enlarged the deficit, caused interest rates to rise, increased the cost of
borrowing, and otherwise interfered with investment and economic growth.
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Finally, the postwar gains of social movements — especially higher wages
and more generous welfare benefits — raised both the standard of living and
the political costs of maintaining the social peace. Like a strike fund, the
welfare state had emboldened workers. It provided an alternative source of
income that reduced workers’ fears of unemployment. This, in turn, strength-
ened the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis employers. Income supports
also made it possible for women to choose welfare over work or marriage and
to decide to raise children on their own, while civil rights gains undercut white
hegemony. No wonder benefits remained so low!
At the same time, in the 1980s, the New Right had gained a strong grip on
U.S. public policy. Troubled by changes in the racial and gendered status quo,
its leaders blamed the welfare state for creating a “crisis” in the family (that is,
the employment of women, high rates of divorce, single motherhood, greater
female autonomy, and gay rights). They called for dismantling the welfare
state as well because it undermined “personal responsibility,” usurped parental
authority, effectively weakened traditional “family values,” and enhanced civil
rights for persons of color.4
Three Decades of Neo-Liberalism
The resulting attack on the welfare state is part of a broader neo-liberal
strategy, designed to restore profitability by downsizing the state and redistrib-
uting income and wealth upward from the have-nots to the haves. Contempo-
rary neo-liberalism revives classical laissez-faire economic theory that was
developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Adam Smith and
David Ricardo. Seeking to undo mercantilist policies that held back emerging
new forms of commerce, Smith and Ricardo argued against government
intervention in the economy and for a self-regulated economy. Like its prede-
cessor, today’s neo-liberalism rejects an expanded role for the government in
order to promote market dynamics. Unlike the past it fuels the attack on the
welfare state seen as standing in the way.
The modern version of neo-liberalism first surfaced in the mid-1970s when
President Carter campaigned for the Democratic Party’s nomination on an
anti-Washington platform. Launched in full by the Reagan administration in
1981, the policies have been pursued in varying degrees by every administra-
tion since then. Reflecting classic conservative doctrine, this laissez-faire
approach seeks to restore profitability by channeling resources to those who
save and invest and by limiting the role of the state. To this end it seeks to (1)
lower the cost of labor, (2) shrink the welfare state, (3) limit the role of the
federal government, (4) and weaken the influence of social movements. Re-
garded as a barrier to cheap money and cheap labor, the welfare state became
an early target of neo-liberal reform. The now familiar tactics include (1) tax
cuts, (2) retrenchment of social programs, (3) devolution or the shift of social
welfare responsibility from the federal government to the states, and (4)
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privatization or the transfer of public responsibility to the private sector. The
benefits of this pro-market strategy, they promised, would trickle down to the
average person. Meanwhile, the New Right called for (5) restoring patriarchal
“family values” and a colorblind social order.
The Neo-Liberal Program
The historical record shows that from 1945 to 1975 the welfare state ex-
panded. But by the mid-to-late 1970s, neo-liberalism began to systematically
halt this trend evidenced by declining tax revenues, mounting deficits, reduced
federal spending, and the contraction of three core welfare state programs —
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Unemployment Insurance
(UI), and Social Security (SS). The expansion and contraction of these pro-
grams are typically discussed separately. But the analysis that follows reveals
that similar tactics were employed in all three programs so that by the mid-
1970s declines were felt across the board.
Falling Tax Revenues
Revenues from individual and corporate taxes rose rather steadily from 9.6
percent of the GDP in 1950 to a high 13.1 percent in 1969. These tax dollars,
along with the Social Security payroll tax, funded the expansion of the govern-
ment, including the welfare state until tax “reform” caused revenues to fall.
Tax receipts ranged from 10 to 11 percent of the GDP in the 1970s and into
the early 1980s, after which they declined again averaging about 9.5 percent
of the GDP. Although the boom of the 1990s briefly drove tax receipts up,5 by
2003, the Bush Administration tax cuts had lowered individual and corporate
income tax revenues to 8.6 percent of the GDP — lower than in 1943.6 The
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities warns that unless Congress repeals a
significant portion of the tax cut, a substantial majority of American house-
holds will be seriously worse-off in years to come.7
Mounting Deficits
During the expansionary postwar years, tax receipts typically covered the
nation’s costs. Indeed, between 1950 and 1970 the annual deficit (counting
Social Security taxes) remained less than 1.5 percent of the GDP for fifteen of
the twenty years or 75 percent of the time. Only five years showed a budget
surplus (that is, 1951, 1956, 1957, 1960, and 1969). Since the early 1970s,
however, high deficits have reigned. Between 1971 and 2002, the federal deficit
exceeded 1.5 percent of the GDP during twenty-five of the thirty-one years or 80
percent of the time — peaking at 4.5 percent of the GDP in 1991. The deficit fell
below 1.5 percent of the GDP in only three years. Likewise, there were only
three budget surpluses.8 In 2003 the deficit soared to $375.3 billion or 5 percent
of the GDP and was projected to jump to $631 billion in 2004.9 The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund warned that the U.S. deficit is now among the highest in
the industrialized world and that if left unchecked it would threaten to increase
global interest rates and choke long-term economic growth.10
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Less Federal Spending
Total federal spending mirrored the pattern and timing of expansion and
contraction. Fueled by robust tax revenues, total federal spending grew rather
steadily during the postwar years from 15.6 percent of the GDP in 1950 to
21.5 percent GDP in 1975. Spending fell slightly to 20 and 21 percent in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. After reaching 23.5 percent of the GDP in 1983
spending declined steadily to 18.6 percent — the same as in 1963. Spending
was projected to fall to 15.8 percent of the GDP in 2004 — the lowest level
since 1950.11
Since the Reagan era, opponents of “big government” have used the large
deficit (created by low tax revenues and high military spending) to rationalize
cutting social programs. Indeed, domestic discretionary spending jumped from
2.5 percent of the GDP in 1962 to a high of 4.8 percent in 1978 after which it
dropped to 3.2 percent in 2001 — the same as in 1965.12 As a share of the
economy, spending will be lower in 2004 than it was in every year from 1975
to 1996.13 After 2005 these cuts grow even larger.14
The End of Welfare, Social Security,
and Unemployment Insurance as
We Knew Them
The status of the AFDC/TANF, Unemployment Insurance (UI), and Social
Security (SS) programs also mirror the pattern and timing of these larger trends.
All three income support programs expanded during the postwar period due to
population growth, liberalized eligibility rules, available tax revenues, the
pressure of popular movements — and because they fueled profits. But both the
troubled political economy and neo-liberal solutions led to a reduction in both
the size of caseloads and the value of benefits. Most people know about welfare
“reform” and its impact on the poor. But neo-liberalism did not spare the UI and
SS programs that serve the middle class as well.
Smaller Caseloads
AFDC/TANF The absolute number of AFDC/TANF recipients rose from 2.2
million in 1950 to 11.3 million in 1976.15 The numbers leveled off during the
late 1970s and early 1980s but surged again during the economic slump of the
early 1990s reaching a new a peak of 14 million in 1994 — two years prior to
the passage of TANF (1996). Opponents of welfare used the steady growth
and high numbers — along with the race card — to fuel support for “ending
welfare as we know it.” In 1996, Congress passed welfare reform, which
stripped AFDC of its entitlement status, transferred responsibility to the states,
converted AFDC from an income support to a work-first program, promoted
family values, and stressed policies of deterrence and punishment.
But focusing only on the high numbers hid the fact that as a proportion of the
total population and the poverty population the size of caseload had begun to
decline in the mid-1970s — paralleling the rise of neo-liberalism. The govern-
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ments own readily available data indicate that the AFDC caseload rose from 1.5
percent of the total population in 1962 to an all time high of 5.2 percent in
1975. But in 1995 — prior to welfare reform — the rolls had fallen to 4.5
percent of the total population. Even more telling, while the caseload rose from
9.3 percent of the poverty population in 1962 to a peak of 46 percent in 1973,
by 1996 it had dropped to 33.3 percent of the poverty group.16
In 2001 after two decades of neo-liberal welfare reforms by the Reagan,
Bush, and Clinton administrations, TANF assisted only 5.2 million recipients
or 1.9 percent of the total population and 16 percent of those living in poverty.
Except for a temporary rise during the recession of the early 1990s, the num-
ber of eligible families participating in the program plummeted from 80.2
percent in 1980 to 51.8 percent in 2000.17 The real questions are how and
what are the other 50 percent doing?
Unemployment Insurance The UI program similarly expanded during the
postwar years and began to contract in the mid-1970s. The number of
jobless workers receiving benefits rose from 26 percent in June 1968 to peak
of 81 percent in April 1976. In the 1980s, despite high unemployment rates
the number of insured workers began a gradual decline reaching 39 percent
in June 2002.18
The contraction stemmed from the application of neo-liberal policies that
undercut the attractiveness and/or the accessibility of the program. This
included the taxation of worker’s benefits (partial in 1979, full in 1989) and
depriving the state UI programs of needed revenues by failing to raise either
the wage base or the employer’s tax.19 In addition, in 1982, the federal govern-
ment ceased to make zero interest loans to states with insolvent UI trust funds.
This significantly increased the cost of borrowing and forced the states to
reduce their UI spending. By the early 1990s, many state UI funds had re-
gained solvency. Instead of increasing benefits or protecting the trust fund’s
solvency, elected state officials cut UI taxes. This won support from employers
but put future UI benefits for workers at risk. 20
Social Security Despite its universality and popularity, the SS program has not
escaped the neo-liberal assault. The Reagan Administration took unprec-
edented aim at the program in the early 1980s. In the name of protecting the
solvency of the Social Security Trust Fund, it gradually raised the retirement
age, limited eligibility, and otherwise slowed the growth of SS. But the main
neo-liberal goal continues to be privatization. Current proposals would
encourage individuals to replace their Social Security retirement pension with a
private IRA and/or invest a portion of the SS trust fund in the stock market.
Channeling public dollars and better off recipients into the private sector
would be a boon for Wall St. But it would weaken the nation’s strongest
entitlement by converting it into a much smaller program, mostly for the poor.
The privatization of public programs also eliminates government jobs that are
filled largely by white women and persons of color.
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Lower benefits
The shift from demand to supply-side economics also undercut the benefit
structure of AFDC/TANF, SS, and UI. During the expansionary post-war years
the government liberalized benefits in all three programs. By the mid- to late-
1970s, however, benefit amounts began to stagnate or fall.
AFDC/TANF The dollar amount of the AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of
three rose from $121 in 1962 to $389 in 1993 and then fell to $351 in 2001.
But when inflation is taken into account, the value of the grant peaked and fell
much earlier. The real purchasing power (2001 dollars) of the grant rose from
$634 in 1962 to a peak $766 in 1969 after which it fell steadily to $351 in
2001. Between 1970 and 2000, it plummeted by 47 percent. Likewise, welfare
expenditures rose from $21 billion in 1970 to $32 billion in 1976, then
dropped to $12.8 million in 2001.21
Unemployment Insurance UI benefits increased from $25 or 32 percent of the
average total weekly wage in 1955, to a peak of $70 or 37 percent in1975.
Although the UI benefit reached $200.29 in 1998, its value now equaled only
32.9 percent of the total average weekly wage — about the same as in the
1955.22 In April 2002, despite mounting long-term joblessness, 50 percent of
those without work ran out of their regular UI benefits, up from 32 percent
just one year earlier.23
Social Security SS benefits also lost ground after the mid-1970s, although
more slowly than AFDC and UI. The Reagan administration eliminated the
minimum grant, reduced the age at which benefits ceased from 18 to 16 for
children of a widow or widower, cut benefits for post-secondary students, and
modified the cost of living adjustment. The wage replacement rate for the
average earner rose from 19.7 percent in 1950 to a high of 54.4 percent in
1981, then slowly fell to 39.2 percent in 2000.24 Annual benefit increases paint
a starker picture. They rose from 7.0 percent in 1965 to 14.3 percent in 1980,
after which they fell steadily reaching a low of 1.4 percent in 2003.25
The Impact of Neo-Liberalsim
Begun in the mid-1970, the neo-liberal attack on the welfare state has furthered
corporate America’s drive for a smaller welfare state, lower labor costs, and an
upward redistribution of income. Profits have soared at the price of lower
wages, deeper poverty, greater inequality, and mounting hardship.
Lower Labor Costs Neo-liberalism furthered corporate America’s drive for
cheap labor. The combination of job insecurity created by de-industrialization
and globalization and the well-documented attack on organized labor forced
workers and unions to accept inferior wage and benefit packages. The retrench-
ment of the welfare state furthered the downward pressure on wages. The loss
of income supports flooded the labor market with thousands of workers in need
of a job. The increased supply of workers made it easier for employers to press
wages down and harder for unions to negotiate strong contracts.
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Wages, which had risen during the postwar years, began to lose ground.
Between 1964 and 1973, the real average hourly wages (in 1982 dollars) of
production workers rose from $7.79 to $9.02, after which the wage dropped
steadily to a low of $7.52 in 1995. It then rose slightly to $7.98 in 2000.26 The
year-to-year wage increases also climbed sharply during the post-war period
from 4.0 percent in 1964 to 8.6 percent in 1979 and 8.8 percent in 1981 after
which they declined steadily falling to 2.0 percent in 1987. Following minor
ups and downs in the 1990s the estimated increase for 2004 dropped to 1.8
percent.27
Nor did workers benefit from recent economic growth. Normally about 65
percent of the growth in national income flows to labor while 15 to 18 percent
goes to corporate profits. In 2002–03, an unprecedented shift occurred.
Corporate profits soared to 41 percent of the growth in national income while
labor received only 38 percent. For the first time since World War II, more
than 20 percent of the national income growth rose to the top.28
Poverty Not surprisingly, the number of people living below the poverty line
also grew. U.S. poverty dropped dramatically during the postwar years from
22.2 percent in 1960 to 11.4 percent of the population in 1979. It jumped to a
high of 15 percent in the 1980s. After falling during the boom of the 1990s,
the rate climbed back to over 12 percent in 2002.29
Hardship The falling standard of living has raised corporate profits while
increasing human misery. Growing numbers of the poor and working poor
report severe problems with mortgage payments, overcrowding, family health,
insufficient food, and lack of access to health care services to name only some
of their mounting hardships.30
Inequality The neo-liberal goal of fueling profits by redistributing income
from the have-nots to the haves has made considerable headway — evidenced
by greater inequality. From 1947 to 1975 the share of the national income held
by the top 20 percent of families actually fell from 43.0 percent 40.7 percent,
while the share held by the lowest one-fifth of families grew from 5.0 percent
to 5.6 percent. In sharp contrast, since the mid-1970s the gap between the rich
and poor has widened. In 2001 the top fifth held 47.7 percent of the national
income compared to only 4.2 percent for the bottom fifth.31
Saving Capitalism From Itself?
To date corporate America has enjoyed the gains of neo-liberalism. But the
warnings of the Center on Budget Priorities and the International Monetary
Fund noted above, raise serious questions about the strategy’s long run ben-
efits to capital. Further, Kotz, a professor of economics, found that the output
and productivity achieved during the first two decades of neo-liberalism
compared unfavorably to those reported during the demonized “big govern-
ment” period.32 Krugman, an economist and New York Times columnist,
reported that neither the neo-liberal tax cuts nor the recent gains in productiv-
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ity have yielded the promised jobs.33 Since business invests only when it
believes that consumption will rise, it is unclear whether the neo-liberal policy,
which has lowered the standard of living for so many will, in the long run,
save capitalism from itself. In the past, market inequalities have sparked mass
protests. The time may be ripe for social movements to rise up angry and
demand a greater share of the economic pie.
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